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THE EFFECTS OF AN EQUAL RIGHTS
AMENDMENT ON THE NEW MEXICO SYSTEM
OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY: PROBLEMS
OF CHARACTERIZATION, MANAGEMENT
AND CONTROL
ANNE K. BINGAMANt

The sections of the New Mexico statutes establishing the
community property system were passed by the Territorial
2
Legislature in 1907.1 They have scarcely been touched since.
In the meantime, revolutionary changes have taken place in
American society. In 1907, between five and ten percent of all
married women worked outside the home.3 In contrast, almost
forty percent of married women worked outside the home for
compensation

in 1970. 4 The importance of working wives'

contributions to family income is demonstrated by the fact that in
those families in which both husband and wife were wage
earners, the median family income in 1969 was $11,629 per year;
family
in families where the wife was not employed, median
5
lower.
percent
income was $8,879, almost twenty-five
Thus, while New Mexico's community property statutes reflect
the role of married women in 1907 society, wives in 1972 occupy
an important place as wage earners and substantial contributors
to many families' incomes. For this reason alone, New Mexico's
community property laws should be critically examined and
Rights Amendment will make
amended. The passage of an Equal
6
imperative.
examination
an
such
t]Assistant Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law. The author
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1. See Laws 1907, ch. 37, which sets forth the statutes now codified as N.M. Stat. Ann.
§§ 57-2-1 through 57-2-13, 57-3-1 through 57-3-9; 57-4-1 through 57-4-3; and 57-4-5 through
57-4-9 (Repl. 1962). N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-4-4 (Repl. 1962) was enacted by Laws 1931, ch. 23 § I to
provide that the conveyances of real property joined in by a minor wife shall have full force and
effect. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-4-10 was enacted by Laws 1965, ch. 74, § I to provide that both
spouses must join in contracts of indemnity which obligate community property.
2. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-4-1 (Repl. 1962) was amended by Laws 1947, ch. 191, § i; see text
below at notes 39 to 63 for a discussion of the amendment. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-4-3 (Repl. 1962)
was amended in 1915 and 1927, by Laws 1915, ch. 84, § Iand Laws 1927, ch. 84, § I.
3. See R. E. Clark, Community of Property and the Family in New Mexico (1956) 1, note 1,
which states that in 1890, 4.5% of married women in the United States worked outside the home
and that by 1910, the figure had increased to only 9.9%.
4. The New York Times Almanac, 483 (1972), and 93 Monthly Labor Rev. 19, June 1970.
5. The New York Times Almanac, 498 (1972).
6. See Kanowitz, The Proposed New Mexico Equal Rights Amendment: Introduction and
Overview, 3 N.M. L. Rev. 1 (1972) for a discussion of the provisions of the proposed amendments
to the New Mexico and United States Constitutions.
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While one is tempted, upon approaching the vagaries of New
Mexico community property law for the first time, to discuss
every perceived defect, such a study is beyond the scope of this
article.7 We shall focus here only upon certain features of the
system which will be clearly unconstitutional if an Equal Rights
Amendment, state or federal, is passed. To that end, this article
will briefly consider whether community property as a system
should be retained; discuss unequal treatment of the spouses in
7. Particularly troublesome is the question of the quantum and type of proof needed to
establish that property purchased with community funds but held by the spouses as joint tenants,
is in fact held in joint tenancy, not community property. N.M. Stat. Ann. §70-1-14.1 (Repl. 1961)
was enacted by Laws 1955, Chapter 174, § I to specifically overrule the Supreme Court's holdings
in Chavez v. Chavez, 56 N.M. 393, 244 P.2d 781 (1952) and In re Trimble's Estate, 57 N.M. 51.
253 P.2d 805 (1953). It provides that a joint tenancy may be established by a preponderance of the
evidence, and does not require "clear and convincing" evidence. However, the Court, in Wiggins
v. Rush, 83 N.M. 133, 489 P.2d 641 (1971), while paying lip service to the statute, gave it no real
effect.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 70-1-34.1 (Rept. 1961), enacted by Laws 1971, ch. 220, § I, was apparently
passed to do away with the need for strawmen in establishing joint tenancies, but may have the
effect of making a joint tenancy deed conclusive evidence that a joint tenancy was in fact created.
A similar transmutation problem is raised by the Court's decision in Burlingham v. Burlingham,
72 N.M. 433, 384 P.2d 699 (1963), holding that clear and convincing evidence, not a mere
preponderance, is necessary to establish that a spouse's separate property has been transmuted to
community property. Justice Moise's dissenting opinion, arguing that a preponderance of the
evidence should suffice, expresses the better rule. For a discussion of the problem in California,
see Griffith, Community Propertyin Joint Tenancy Form, 14 Stan. L. Rev. 87(1961); and K nutson,
California Community Property Laws: A Pleafor Legislative Study and Reform, 39 S. Cal. L. Rev.
240 at 252 (1966). A thorough study of New Mexico law is urgently needed.
Another problem currently not dealt with by New Mexico statutory or case law is that of the
putative spouse. While the New Mexico Supreme Court held in In re Gabaldon's Estate, 38 N.M.
392, 34 P.2d 672, 94 A.L.R. 980 (1935) that common law marriages were not valid in New Mexico
and would not serve as a basis for establishing rights in property accrued during the time the
spouses cohabited, there is good reason to distinguish the situation of the putative spouse from
that of the common law spouse. In a putative marriage, a ceremony has been performed and all
requisites of a valid marriage are present except that some legal impediment prevented the
marriage from being legal; a putative spouse, by definition, in good faith believes himself or
herself to have been legally married. Thus different considerations are present in determining
whether to give a putative marriage effect as a basis for property rights than are present in the case
of common law marriages. Most states which have decided the question have found some basis
for allowing the wife, usually the spouse claiming a share under a putative marriage theory, to
share in the property accumulated during the marriage. See, Right of a defacto Wife to Obtain a
Share of Jointly Accumulated Property, 2 Williamette L.J. 207 (1962) for a description of various
theories used to accord the putative spouse an interest in property acquired during the marriage.
It is possible that denial of the right of a putative wife to share in the putative husband's earnings
accumulated during a void marriage may be another example of a rule neutral between the sexes
on its face, but discriminatory in application. The overwhelming majority of men are the
wage-earners in a family, and will, if putatitve marriages are not recognized as a basis for
acquiring rights in property acquired during the marriage, keep all such property as their separate
property. Putative wives, over 60% of whom will be house-keepers and have no earnings, will in
fact be discriminated against by such a rule. See discussion of laws neutral on their face but
discriminatory in application at notes 27-29. infra.
Because the definition of "marriage" is basic to determining rights of "spouses" in community
property, the question should be dealt with in New Mexico in any general revision of the
community property laws.
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defining the status of property as community or separate; and
propose and weigh alternatives to the husband's almost exclusive
rights of management and control of community property under
present law. 8 The present debt and credit provisions of the
community property system and alternatives thereto are considered elsewhere in this issue.9
COMMUNITY PROPERTY AS A MARITAL PROPERTY SYSTEM

There are three basic marital property systems in use in
Western societies today: separate property systems; community
property systems; and intermediate systems which share features
of both separate and community marital property regimes. 10 We
will examine the major features of each and its suitability to use
in New Mexico in 1972.
SeparateProperty Systems
Forty-two states of the United States have a form of separate
property as their marital property systems, as do Great Britain
and the English-speaking provinces of Canada.' These systems
evolved from the common law method of marital property
holding, as modified by the Married Women's Property Acts
passed in the nineteenth century. Generally in these jurisdictions,
the separate property of each spouse includes property brought
to the marriage, property inherited by or given to the spouse
during marriage, and all earnings of the spouse during marriage.
In other words, no property is owned in common by the spouses
unless they specifically place title to the property in some form of
joint ownership. As at common law, the husband is under a duty
to support his wife, and the wife has a somewhat modified duty
A.

8. Interest in equalizing the impact of the community property system upon spouses in New
Mexico is not new. In 1953, the New Mexico S!ate Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 3
establishing an Interim Committee to "study the community property laws for the purpose of
presenting the Twenty-second Legislature recommendations toward equalizing the rights and
obligations of women under the community property system." (Laws 1953, Senate Resolution No.
3.) In response to the Resolution, Joe W. Wood, then Assistant Director of the Legislative Council
Service, and now Chief Judge of the New Mexico Court of Appeals, prepared an exhaustive
survey of New Mexico community property law, outlining unequal treatment accorded the
spouses and recommending specific areas of revision. See J. Wood. The Community Property
Law of New Mexico (1954) [hereinafter cited as Wood]. Unfortunately, however, no legislative
response to the study was forthcoming.
9. See Ellis, Equal Rights and the Debt Provisions of a New Mexico Community Property Law, 3
N.M. L. Rev. 57 (1972).
10. See generally. Matrimonial Property Law (1955).
11. Id.
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of rendering services to her husband. 12 Each spouse is given a
statutory or non-barrable share in the other spouse's separate
estate upon the other spouse's death, which usually amounts to
one-third or one-half of the other spouse's separate property. It
has been stated that, insofar as benefits for the surviving spouse
upon death are concerned, there is little to distinguish the
modified common law approach of the separate property systems
from the community property approach. 13 While this is true if the
wife survives her husband, it ignores the obvious fact that the
wife who predeceases her husband, who never worked for
compensation and who acquired no other separate property
during her lifetime will, unlike the wife in all community
property states except New Mexico, 14 have nothing to leave
anyone. She will be literally penniless at death.
In spite of this and other defects set forth below, the separate
property system has been hailed by some as a great advance, and
as a good means of insuring perfect equality between the
spouses; 15 each has the absolute management and control of his
or her separate property acquired during life, and each is
accorded legally neutral treatment insofar as an interest in the
other's property upon the other spouse's death.
B. Community Property Systems
In eight states of the United States,' 6 the Soviet Union, France,
Quebec, the Union of South Africa, and Spain,' 7 to mention the
most prominent jurisdictions, the marital property system known
as community property is in use. Under this system, each spouse
is entitled to keep as his or her separate property all property
brought to the marriage and all property acquired by gift or
inheritance during marriage, and is entitled to manage and
control that property absolutely. All other property acquired
during the marriage, including most commonly the earnings of
12. See generally, Sayre, A Reconsideration of Husband's Duty to Support and Wife's Duly to
Render Services, 29 Va.L. Rev. 857 (1943).
13. Marsh, Marital Property in Conflict of Laws 45 (1952).
14. See note 19 infra and accompanying text concerning the situation in New Mexico under
current law.
15. Dean, Matrimonial Property Law in the State of New York, in Matrimonial Property Law
363(1955).
16. California, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, Louisiana, Nevada, Idaho and Washington. See
generally De Funiak and Vaughn, Principles of Community Property (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter
cited as De Funiak and Vaughn).
17. See generally, Matrimonial Property Law (1955) and essays collected therein.
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both spouses, is community property in which each spouse owns
a present and vested half interest. Under the original Spanish
law, and in four of the community property states today,
including New Mexico, the husband is accorded all rights to
manage and dispose of property of the community, 8 including
the earnings of the wife, subject to certain modern statutory
requirements that the wife join in conveyances of real property.' 9
Upon the death of either spouse, in all community property
states of the United States except New Mexico, the decedent
spouse may will his or her one-half interest in the community
property. In New Mexico only the husband has the right to will
his interest in the community; the wife's half interest, although
"present and vested", goes entirely to her husband if she
predeceases him.20
C. The "Participationin Acquests" System
In the Scandinavian countries, a marital property system
known as "participation in acquests" has been devised which
blends features of both the separate and community property
systems.
Just as in both community and separate property systems, any
property either spouse brings to the marriage or acquires by gift
or inheritance during marriage is that spouse's separate property
and subject to his or her sole control and disposition. During the
continuance of the marriage, as under a separate property
system, each spouse's earnings are viewed as separate property
21
subject to the earning spouse's sole management and control.
18. As to the Texas statute governing management and control of community property, see
note 21, infra, and text below at notes 99-108. California, Washington and Idaho allow the wife to
manage her own earnings until they become commingled with other community property, after
which the husband has sole management powers. See Cal. Civ. Code § 5124 (West 1970); Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. § 26.16.130(1961); and Idaho Code Ann. § 32-912 (1948).
19. Under the original Spanish law, the husband had full rights to dispose of community real
property. De Funiak and Vaughn, supra note 16, at § 113. The eight community property states in
the United States added the requirement of joinder of the wife in conveyances of real property,
presumably as a protection of her interests in what was, at the time the requirement was imposed,
the most valuable form of property held by the community. See Community Property and
Women's Rights, Law and the Social Order 163, 173 (1972).
20. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-1-8 (1953). On the subject of the amendment of this section required
by an Equal Rights Amendment. see Schlenker, Tax Implications of the Equal Rights Amendment,
3 N.M. L. Rev. 69 (1972); see also Power of Testamentary Disposition and Inequality Between the
Spouses, 7 Natural Resources J. 645 (1967).
21. The 1967 Texas Legislature amended its community property statutes to allow each spouse
plenary rights of management and control over "community property that he or she would have
owned if single." Thus, while retaining the community property system, Texas has instituted a
system of community property management which operates very much like a separate property
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Upon dissolution of the marriage, however, whether by divorce,
legal separation or death, the property acquired during the
marriage-that property which would be community were the
system a community system-is divided equally between the
spouses, after subtracting from each spouse's contribution that
spouse's debts outstanding at the date of dissolution. The spouses
share in each other's gains,22 but not in losses; hence the name,
"participation in acquests".
Thus, during marriage the features of a separate property
system are prominent, but upon dissolution of the marriage,
features similar to a community property system are employed.
As one leading authority on marital property systems comments:
[the participations in acquests system] is not in reality a reformed
community system but a separation of property system, in which
and liquidation of the
the community idea only affects the partition
23
assets after the dissolution of the regime.

With this brief description of the major features of each
property system, we turn to a comparison of their desirability.
A major and serious defect of both the separate property and
participation in acquests systems is that the only method either
provides for a wife to acquire property of her own during
marriage is employment outside the home for compensation. By
law, her husband's earnings during marriage are his separate
property in which she has no interest or right. Thus, unless the
wife has earnings of her own, both legal systems deny her the
possibility of acquiring property. While the situation of a paying
job has appeal in some cases many wives and husbands feel that
the wife should remain at home to care for the children and
family needs. Further, because of lower wage scales, the expenses
of house and child care may devour the largest part of a working
24
wife's salary.

Because of this defect, many students of marital property
systems believe that the community property system, modified
system. However, if what would have been the separate property of either spouse is commingled
with other property, the sole management powers of the earnings spouse cease, and the property
is subject to the spouses' joint management. See Tex. Family Code § 5.22 (Pamphlet 1972); and
see discussion of this provision infra at notes 99-108.
22. Sussman, Spouses and Their Property Under Swedish Law, 12 Am. J. Comparative Law
553 (1963). See also Pederson, Matrimonial Property Law in Denmark, 28 Modern L. Rev. 137
(1965).

23. Friedmann, A ComparativeAnalysis, in Matrimonial Property Law 433, 445 (1955).
24. 93 Monthly Labor Rev. 19, June 1970.
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from its present form so as to give the wife completely equal
management powers with the husband, is the best system
available for holding marital property. The Committee on Civil
and Political Rights of the President's Commission on the Status
of Women reported to President Kennedy in October, 1963 that:
Marriage as a partnership in which each spouse make a different
but equally important contribution is increasingly recognized as a
reality in this country and is already reflected in the laws of some
other countries. During marriage, each spouse should have a legally
defined, substantial right in the earnings of the other, in the real and
personal property acquired through those earnings, and in their
management. Such a right should be legally recognized as surviving
the marriage in the event of its termination by divorce, annulment
or death.2 5 (Emphasis added.)

Professor Leo Kanowitz, in Women and the Law, draws the
26
same conclusion.
At the first level, this feature of the separate property system is
simply a policy question for the Legislature: Is it desirable to
establish a marital property system which defines "property" in
such a way that the sixty percent of married women who do not
work outside the home are unable to acquire any of their own?
At a second level, however, a legal system which so defines
marital property rights may be subject to constitutional attack
under an Equal Rights Amendment. In a recent analysis, several
authors concluded that a separate marital property system
should, under the federal Equal Rights Amendment, be subjected to special scrutiny as a system neutral on its face, but which in
operation discriminates against women.2 7 The analysis states:
The problem of formally neutral laws which may have a
discriminatory impact arises under any law which attempts to
eradicate discrimination based upon a single prohibited factor in a
context where many other factors may legitimately be taken into
account. The same issues have consistently appeared in the
enforcement of laws prohibiting discrimination because of race,
religion, natural origin, and labor organizing activity. The courts
have responded by looking beyond the adoption of the "neutral"
25. American Women. The Report of the President's Commission on the Status of Women 69
(1963).
26. Kanowitz, Women and the Law: The Unfinished Revolution 69 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Kanowitz].
27. Brown, Emerson. Falk and Freedman. The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional
Basisfor Equal Rightsfor Women, 80 Yale L. J. 871, 899, 948, n. 168 (1971).
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classification into the realities of purpose, practical operation, and
28
effect.

Thus, while the separate property system is officially neutral-either spouse is legally free to work outside the home and
accumulate separate property-it ignores the reality that in our
society women are still expected to assume primary responsibility
for care of home and children. They are thus prevented
practically, if not legally, from accumulating the separate
property which society anticipates husbands will accumulate.
Such a marital property system may be comparable to laws in
other areas struck down under the Equal Protection Clause
because, although neutral on their face, in operation they
discriminated against a group protected by the Equal Protection
Clause or another law prohibiting discrimination.2 9
In addition to being undesirable from a policy standpoint, both
the separate property and participation in acquests systems may
be unconstitutional under an Equal Rights Amendment.
The community property system is definitely preferable on this
point. It accords both spouses a "present, vested interest" 30 in all
property acquired by either spouse during marriage, except that
acquired by inheritance or gift. The labor and contributions of
the wife who works caring for home and children are thus
accorded "dignity and equality", 3 1 and entitle her to a one-half
interest in her husband's earnings. With the changes required by
the Equal Rights Amendment in the areas of management and
control and testamentary disposition, the community property
system will be more equitable and more consonant with the
modern role of married women than is either the separate
property or participation in acquests systems.
28. Id. at 899.
29. Id.at 899, n.5. The authors cite as examples of cases which have struck down classifications
which were neutral on their face because they were discriminatory in effect, Gaston County v.
United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969) (holding a North Carolina literacy test invalid because black
persons had been denied access to the state's educational system and could not pass it; Gomillion
v. Light, 364 U.S. 399 (1960), (striking down an "ostensibly neutral classification" which operated
to discriminate against the right of blacks to vote); and Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939). Other
cases cited in support of the proposition by the authors include Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971); Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963) ; and United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education 372 F.2d 826 (5th Cir.,
1966).
30. All eight community property states now agree that the wife's property interest is "present
and vested." De Funiak and Vaughn, supra note 16, at § 105.
31. Sayre, A Reconsideration of Husband's Duty to Support and Wife 's Duty to Render Services,
supra note 12, at 859.
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Another major reason for preserving a community property
system rather than adopting a separate property or a participation in acquests system is, very simply, that most married couples
in a normal marriage relationship treat the property acquired by
the efforts of the spouses during marriage as community property, regardless of the formal legal system imposed upon marital
property by the laws of the jurisdiction in which they live. A
noted expert on English matrimonial property law concludes:
The Law may insist on separation of ownership and even postulate
separate possession in the legal sense: separate ownership or
separate administration is incompatible with normal married life. 3 2

Another author writes:
The average western family of today-living on the earnings of the
husband and, in many cases, of the wife, with little to spare above
current needs, and with that degree of harmony which makes
recourse to the law superfluous-inevitably practices community
rather than separation of property. It is bound to regard . . . the
household community as "an economic entity with funds of money,
with movable and often with immovable property dedicated to
common use.". . . [Als regards the running of the household, the
acquisition or sale of a matrimonial home, or even major financial
transactions . . . the spouses will, in the overwhelming majority of
cases, consult together and pool their resources without much
thought of separation or community of property. 33

These observations have the ring of truth and common sense,
and most married persons will probably agree that such statements mirror their own attitudes. If the goal of a rational system
of marital property ownership is to reflect the actual principles by
which married couples order their property, a form of community property should be chosen.
Finally, New Mexico has well-known and special historical
reasons for choosing to reform and amend its community
property system rather than to discard it altogether in favor of an
unfamiliar, untried and philosophically inferior separate
property or participation in acquests system. The Spanish
community property law was brought to New Mexico by Spanish
and Mexican colonizers in the seventeenth century, and has
32. Kahn-Freund, Matrimonial Property-Some Recent Developments, 22 Modern L. Rev. 241
(1959). See also to the same effect, Comment, The Reform of French Matrimonial PropertyLaw, 14
Am. J. Comparative Law 308, 322 n. 126 (1965).
33. Friedmann, A Comparative Analysis, supra note 23, at 433. See also Rheinstein, The Need
for Research in FamilyLaw, 16 U. Chi. L. Rev. 691, 694(1949).
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remained here since that time. It is completely accepted by
residents of New Mexico, and, with common sense work and
objective policy decisions, it can be amended and reshaped into
the fairest and most satisfactory marital property system available.
UNEQUAL TREATMENT OF THE SPOUSES IN THE
CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY AS SEPARATE OR
COMMUNITY

Inherent in the notion of a community property system is the
necessity of defining certain property as "community" or "separate." Both the original Spanish law and the New Mexico statutes
now in effect are disarmingly simple on this point. Separate
property is defined in New Mexico as all property owned by
either spouse before marriage and property acquired afterwards
by gift, bequest, devise or descent, with the rents, issues and
profits therefrom. 34 Community property is then customarily,
and in New Mexico, defined by exclusion as all property which is
not separate property. 35 Although written as absolute definitions
of community and separate property, these sections have been
interpreted by the New Mexico Supreme Court as simply
establishing presumptions which may be rebutted by evidence to
36
the contrary.
From these simple definitions much litigation has arisen
concerning the status of particular types of income received
during marriage; these cases would remain as authoritative
interpretations if a new statute were enacted defining separate
34. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 57-3-4 and 57-3-5 (Repl. 1962). The original Spanish Law, still followed
in Texas. Idaho and Louisiana, was that the rents, issues and profits of separate property which
accrued after marriage were community, not separate, property. De Funiak and Vaughn, supra
note 16, at § 71. This definition avoids many of the difficult problems of apportionment of income
between separate and community property which arise under the New Mexico definition when a
spouse devotes effort after marriage to an enterprise which is that spouse's separate property. For
the New Mexico Supreme Court's struggles with this problem, see Laughlin v. Laughlin, 49 N.M.
20, 155 P.2d 1010(1945).
35. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-4-1 (Repl. 1962).
36. In re Faulkner's Estate, 35 N.M. 125, 290 P. 801 (1930) and Carron v. Abounador, 28 N.M.
491, 214 P. 772 (1923) held that a preponderance of the evidence was sufficient to rebut the
presumptions. However, other cases have required "clear and convincing" evidence, not a mere
preponderance, to rebut the presumptions. See Burlingham v. Burlingham, 72 N.M. 433, 384 P.2d
699 (1963); and In re Trimble's Estate, 57 N.M. 51, 253 P.2d 805 (1953), overruled by the
enactment of N.M. Stat. Ann. 70-1-14.1 (Repl. 1961) enacted by Laws 1955, Chapter 174,
Section 1, but cited with approval by the majority in Burlingham.
Whether a given presumption must be rebutted by "clear and convincing" evidence or a mere
preponderance, its procedural effect is to shift both the burden of going forward with evidence
and the burden of persuasion. See Wood, supra note 8, at 35.
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and community property in substantially the same language as
that used in the present statute. 37 Since none of these holdings
raises a problem under the Equal Rights Amendment, a discussion of the cases and the wisdom of specific interpretations is
beyond the scope of this article.
Two provisions of New Mexico law defining the status of
property received after marriage as separate or community would
raise problems under an Equal Rights Amendment, however,
and both discriminate against New Mexico husbands. They are
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-4-1 (1953),
establishing certain
presumptions as to property conveyed in writing to a married
woman, and N.M. Stat. Ann § 57-3-7 (1953), which declares that
the wife's earnings while the spouses are living separately are her
separate property, not community property. We will also examine in this section Supreme Court decisions holding that a gift
of community funds to the wife is presumed in certain situations;
and that property purchased on the wife's separate credit is her
separate property, while the husband's separate credit is
presumptively exercised on behalf of the community.
A difficult problem is raised whenever a statute or court
decision establishing property rights is amended or overruled.
The problem is simply whether the amendment or overruling is
prospective only, and therefore affects only property acquired
after the effective date of the amendment; or whether it affects
rights in property acquired prior to the effective date of the
amendment. While discussion of this problem is beyond the
scope of this article, it can finally be solved only by one of two
means: legislative restriction of the application of any amendments in the community property statutes to property acquired
after the effective date of the amendments; or in the absence of
such a restriction, a court test to determine the constitutionality
of such amendments as applied to rights in property acquired
prior to their effective dates. Possibly because the first alternative
would require the state to operate under two systems of
community property for the next forty or fifty years, 38 the
37. See Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3d ed.. Horack, 1943). §§ 5105 and 5109 wherein
literally hundreds of cases are cited for the proposition that where the Legislature re-enacts a
statute in the same words, it is presumed to know of and assent to prior judicial construction of
the statute. Under this principle, re-enactment of N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 57-3-4. 57-3-5 and the first
clause of § 57-4-I (Repl. 1962) presumptively approves of interpretations given those sections by
the New Mexico Supreme Court.
38. An extensive analysis by one commentator recently concluded that there is no substantial
constitutional objection to retroactive amendment of community property statutes. See Knutson.
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Legislature should enact a nonrestrictive statute ane leave its
constitutionality open to a court test. A non-restrictive statute
would have the disadvantage, however, of rendering title to
property acquired prior to the effective date of the statute
uncertain until the Supreme Court had ruled on its constitutionality.
PresumptionsContained in N.M. Stat. A nn. § 57-4-1 (1953)
This section establishes three special presumptions concerning
39
the character of property acquired during marriage by women.
These are:

A.

(1) that any interest in real or personal property conveyed by an
instrument in writing to a married woman is her separate property;
(2) that real or personal property conveyed by an instrument in
writing to a married woman and any other person is held by the
married woman as a tenant-in-common unless a different intention
is set forth in the instrument; and
(3) that real or personal property conveyed to a husband and
wife by an instrument in writing in which they are described as
husband and wife is community property unless a different
intention is expressed in the conveyance.

Each of these presumptions should simply be deleted from the
New Mexico statutes, leaving only the general presumption of
community property where property is acquired by husband or
wife, or both together, during marriage. In addition, the Legislature should seriously consider specifically stating that no
presumption of gift of community funds exists in New Mexico
where title to property acquired with community funds is taken
40
in the name of either spouse alone.
We turn now to a discussion of the effect of these presumptions
under present law.
1. Presumption that Real or Personal Property Conveyed to a
Married Woman by an Instrument in Writing is Her Separate
Property.
California Community Property Laws: A Pleafor Legislative Study and Reform, 39 S. Cal. L. Rev.
240, 266-73 (1966).
Although the case did not so hold, the New Mexico Supreme Court in Albright v. Albright, 21
N.M. 606, 157 P. 662 (1922) suggested that retroactive amendments would not be constitutional in
New Mexico. See also for a discussion of this problem in New Mexico, Wood, supra note 8, 31-33.
39. This section was copied almost verbatim from the California provision. See note 53 infra.
40. The presumption of a gift of community funds to the wife where title to property acquired
with community funds is taken in the name of the wife alone may have been grafted onto the
New Mexico community property system by the New Mexico Supreme Court in August v. Tillian,

January 1973]

NEW MEXICO COMMUNITY PROPERTY

This presumption would be unconstitutional under an Equal
Rights Amendment because, while property acquired by a
married woman by an instrument in writing is presumptively her
separate property, property acquired by a- married man in his
name alone is presumed to be community property under the
general rule set41 forth in the first clause of N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 57-4-1 (1953).
While no authority has been found explaining the reason for
the present provision, it is possible that it was enacted because in
1907 it may have more accurately reflected the probabilities as to
the grantor's actual intent than would a non-discriminatory
presumption. It was undoubtedly not common in 1907 for
married women to handle property transactions on behalf of the
community; this can be seen from N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-4-3
(1953), which positively prohibits them from managing or
disposing of community property. Thus, any property conveyed
to a married woman in her name alone was more likely intended
to be her separate property and not community property.
In 1907, then, this presumption might have made sense, and
accurately reflected the actual probabilities of title in a majority
of property transactions. In 1972 it does not make sense, and it
will be unconstitutional under an Equal Rights Amendment.
42
As Professor Leo Kanowitz has pointed out, unequal treatment can be corrected by extending the privilege now afforded
one sex to the other, or by removing the privileged treatment
altogether for both. Here, the presumption could be amended to
provide that property acquired by either spouse by an instrument
in writing is presumed to be that spouse's separate property, or
provision could simply be deleted from the statute
the present
43
entirely.
The latter choice is preferable for two reasons. First, the
general policy of the state is that all property acquired during
marriage by either spouse is community property. To enact a
51 N.M. 74, 178 P.2d 590 (1947). See generally on the problem, Wood, supra note 8, at 38-41, and
text below at notes 55 et seq.
41. The first clause of N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-4-1 (Repl. 1962) provides: "All other real and
personal property acquired after marriage by either husband or wife, or both, is community
property . . . . The exceptions which apply to married women only are then set forth in the
remainder of the section.
42. Kanowitz, supra note 26, at 120.
43. Deleting the provision altogether would mean that the first clause of N.M. Stat. Ann.
§57-4-1 (Repl. 1962) would be left standing, and property acquired by either spouse during
marriage would be presumed to be community property. See text at note 41 supra.
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presumption favoring separate property where either spouse
acquires property during marriage in his or her name alone
would result in undercutting a large part of the rule of
community property with an exception establishing separate
property. Further, because of the possibility of fraud inherent in
such a rule, each spouse would have to be constantly aware of
every transaction effected with community property and of the
state of all titles to real and personal property in order to insure
that property acquired with community funds was in fact held in
the names of both spouses.4 4 Enlarging the scope of the
presumption to include property held in the name of the husband
alone would be clearly undesirable.
Second, part of the function of certain presumptions in
community property law is to express the probabilities, as
assessed by the Legislature, of the parties' intent as to title to
property. A rebuttable presumption which aids in establishing
the character of property as separate or community should reflect
what the probable intent of the parties was as to ownership of
that property. In a society where most people do not bring a large
amount of property to marriage, and don't inherit fortunes, 45 it is
undoubtedly true that the majority of property owned by the
majority of married couples in New Mexico was purchased with
funds which were community, not separate, property. Accordingly, the general presumption as to the status of property acquired
44. See text at note 102 below concerning present problems of overcoming the presumption
of
separate property when title is in the wife's name alone. The New Mexico Supreme Court held
in
August v. Tillian, 51 N.M. 74, 178 P.2d 590 (1947) that the stipulated fact that property
was
bought with community funds was not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the wife held
as her separate property. This problem might be overcome with the enactment of a section
specifically overruling the presumption of gift which may have been responsible for the Tillian
decision.
45. A small and incomplete indication of the amount of inherited wealth in New Mexico may
be gleaned from statistics contained in a November 25, 1970 letter to Mr. Franklin Jones,
Commissioner of Revenue, State of New Mexico, from Mr. Maurice E. Johnson, District
Director, Internal Revenue Service, Albuquerque, New Mexico. Mr. Johnson states in that letter
that the total amount of "Credit for State Death Taxes" claimed in returns filed in calendar
year
1966 by decedents who died residents of New Mexico was $385,766.85, claimed on 124 returns
filed; the amount claimed for the calendar year 1967 was $504,097.70, claimed on 138 filed
returns.
The credit for state death taxes is provided for in 26 U.S.C. §2011 for taxable
estates over
$40,000. 26 U.S.C. § 2052 provides an exemption of $60,000 in computing the value
of the taxable
estate. New Mexico imposes a tax on net estates equal to the maximum credit for state
death taxes
allowable under 26 U.S.C. § 2011. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-16-25 (1953).
Thus, it may be seen that only 124 New Mexico decedents for whose estates returns
were filed
in 1966 had estates valued at over $100.000; only 138 such decedents for whose
estates returns
were filed in 1967 had estates valued over $100,000.
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in the name of either spouse alone during marriage should
establish such property as community not separate, property.
2. Presumption that Property Acquired by a Married Woman
and any Other Person by an Instrument in Writing is Taken by
Her as a Tenant-in-Common, Not as Community Property, Unless
a Different Intention is Expressed in the Instrument.
This presumption reflects the same policy as the presumption
just discussed, but applies it to the situation in which the wife is
named in an instrument of title along with another person. The
other person may be her husband or someone other than her
husband. In both cases, the result is the same-the wife takes as
her separate property-as a tenant-in-common-while the husband takes property similarly conveyed to him under the general
presumption of community property contained in the first clause
of § 57-4-1.46 Like the first presumption, it is patently discriminatory against husbands, and will be unconstitutional under an
Equal Rights Amendment. Because the state's marital property
policy has been declared to be one of community property, and
because a presumption of community property will reflect the
probabilities of ownership more closely than would a
presumption of separate property, this presumption also should
be deleted from the New Mexico statutes, leaving the general
presumption of community property as the rule.
If this is done, the rule announced as to husbands by the New
47
Mexico Supreme Court in Adams v. Blumenshine will apply to
wives also; it will be presumed that the interest of either spouse
in property held with a person not the other spouse is community
property. Similarly, either spouse's interest in a partnership will
be presumed community property, although interest in specific
held by the partnership is, by statute, not community
property 48
property.
Whether an interest held by a spouse as a joint tenant with
someone not the other spouse is community property presents a
the
question beyond the scope of the present article. However,
49 that,
Thaxton,
v.
Thaxton
in
held
New Mexico Supreme Court
46. August v. Tillian, 51 N.M. 74, 178 P.2d 590 (1947).
47. 27 N.M. 643,204 P. 66(1921), 20 A.L.R. 369(1922).
Aspects of
48. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-1-25(e) (Repl. 1960). See also Moise, "Some Practical
at the Annual
Community Property Law in New Mexico" (unpublished address delivered
Meeting of the State Bar of New Mexico, October 1950, Carlsbad, New Mexico) at 22.
49. 75 N.M. 450, 405 P.2d 932 (1965).
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upon the death of the other joint tenant, a wife was entitled to a
one-quarter interest in United States Savings Bonds purchased
by her husband with community funds and held by him as ajoint
tenant. 50
The application of this presumption to situations where a
married woman takes title to property in an instrument in writing
with a person not her husband has been discussed above. Its
application to the situation where a married woman and her
husband are named as the grantees in an instrument in writing
was passed upon by the New Mexico Supreme Court in August v.
Tillian.5 ' While the specific holding there was subsequently
reversed by the New Mexico Legislature, it may still have
troublesome consequences in other situations. In the August case
real property was conveyed to "John Doe and Jane Doe,
husband and wife." The Court held that, because the husband
was "any other person" within the literal wording of § 57-4-1, the
wife took her half interest as a tenant in common, and therefore
held it as her separate property, while her husband held his
interest as community property in which his wife had a one-half
interest. The wife therefore had a three-quarters interest in the
property while her husband had only a one-quarter interest. In so
holding, the Court followed the California Supreme Court's
ruling to the same effect in Dunn v. Mullan.52
The patent unfairness of the A ugust decision was observed and
reversed by the New Mexico Legislature in 1947. 53 However, the
reversal was perhaps too express, because it excepted from the
presumption under which August was decided only the precise
fact situation presented in the case, that in which property is
conveyed to husband and wife who are described as such in the
conveyance. Thus, the August holding may still have vitality
50. It has been suggested that the wife could have successfully claimed a one-half,
rather than
a one-quarter, interest in the proceeds and thereby recovered not only the value
of the community
contribution but also a one-half interest in the gain which accrued to her husband
when the other
joint tenant died. See Community Property-Husband's Use of Community Funds
to Enter Joint
Tenancy with Third Party, 6 Natural Resources J. 298 (1966). What the result should
have been if
the husband had died leaving the other joint tenant surviving is not discussed. The
author implies
that the surviving joint tenant would take the entire property, leaving the wife with
no interest in
the property and no rights against the husband's estate for her share of the lost community
funds.
51. 51 N.M. 74, 178 P.2d 590(1947).
52. 211 Cal. 583,296P.604(1931).
53. See Laws 1947, ch. 191, § 1. This amendment was apparently copied from
a 1935
amendment to Cal. Civ. Code § 164. See Cal. Civ. Code § 164, as amended by
Cal. Stats. (1935)
ch. 707, § 1, p. 1912 (now codified as Cal. Civ. Code §5110 [West]); and see Clark,
Presumptions
in the New Mexico Community Property Laws: The CaliforniaInfluence, 25 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 149,
157, n. 58 (1952).
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where a conveyance is made only to "John Doe and Jane Doe,"
persons who are in fact husband and wife but are not described
as such in the conveyance. Under the rationale of August, such a
conveyance would result in Jane Doe taking a three-quarters
interest in the property and John Doe taking one-quarter.
To accord with the basic presumption of community property
and reflect the probabilities as to parties' actual intentions, this
presumption also should be deleted from the New Mexico
statutes.
3. Presumption That Property Conveyed by an Instrument in
Writing to a Husband and Wife Describedas Husband and Wife is
Community Property, Unless a Different Intention is Expressed in
the Conveyance.
As just discussed, this amendment was enacted in 194754 to
overrule the holding in August. However, by drafting the
amendment so narrowly, the Legislature left open the possibility
that a conveyance to a husband and wife who are not described
as husband and wife in the conveyance will result in the wife's
taking a three-quarter interest in the property while the husband
takes only a one-quarter interest.
For the reasons set forth earlier, this presumption also should
be removed, leaving the basic presumption in favor of community property.
4. Presumption of Gift of Community Funds to the Wife
It might rationally be thought that, should an Equal Rights
Amendment fail to pass, the presumptions discussed above, while
not desirable, could be tolerated because they could be rebutted
simply by showing that the property in question was purchased
with community funds.
The New Mexico Supreme Court held as much in Albright v.
Albright.55 There, property held in the wife's name alone had
been purchased with community funds. The Court found that
such evidence was sufficient to rebut the first presumption of
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-4-1 (1953) and that the property was
therefore community, not separate. If Albright were the only case
decided on the subject, § 57-4-1 would not present such a difficult
problem for New Mexico attorneys.
54. Laws 1947, ch. 191,§ 1.
55. 45N.M.302, 115P.2d59(1916).
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However, in August 5 6 the Court announced the presumption of
gift of community funds to the wife. In that case, as we have seen,
property was conveyed to "John Doe and Jane Doe, husband
and wife." It was stipulated by the parties that the property was
purchased with community funds. Regardless of that fact, the
court held that, under the California precedent of Dunn v.
Mullan,57 it must be presumed that the husband intended a gift
of his interest in the community funds to his wife. The result, as
we have seen, was that the wife took an effective three-quarters
interest in the property, the husband only one-quarter. Thus,
after August, simply showing that property was purchased with
community funds will not overcome the presumptions of § 57-4-1
establishing the property as separate property of the wife.
While one leading authority has stated that the presumption of
gift was not logically necessary to the holding in A ugust,58 that
the New Mexico Supreme Court believed it to be is evidenced by
the Court's statement in In re Trimble's Estate:5 9
In August v. Tillian, in construing said [N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-4-1
prior to its amendment, we recognized that a presumption of gift to
the wife did exist where property was conveyed to husband and
wife as tenants in common, with the result the wife owned one-half
as her separate property, and owned an additional quarter interest
in the property by virtue of the fact the husband's interest was
community property.

Thus, the presumption of gift of community funds to the wife
seems well established by New Mexico case law and must be
dealt with if an Equal Rights Amendment is passed. 60 Several
factors dictate legislative negation of the presumption in any
general revision of the community property statutes.
First, the presumption is simply not in accord with the tenet
basic to a community property system that property acquired by
56. 51 N.M. 74, 178 P.2d 590(1947).
57. 211 Cal. 583, 296 P. 604(1931).
58. See Wood, supra note 8, at 40, where, after close analysis of the reasoning and
presumptions used by the August v. Tillian court, he states that the presumption of gift was not
logically necessary to the result in the case.
59. 57N.M 51,253 P.2d 805(1953).
60. The Equal Rights Amendment, like the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment,
will apply only to "state action" as that phrase is used in cases decided under the Equal Protection
Clause. It has been well-established by those cases that judicial decisions constitute "state action"
and, if discriminatory, are unconstitutional, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I (1948); McGhee v.
Sipes, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Under these cases, decisions of the New Mexico Supreme Court which
establish rules of law discriminating on the basis of sex will be unconstitutional under an Equal
Rights Amendment.
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either spouse during marriage is presumed to be community, not
separate, property. Were the presumption retained and extended
to both husbands and wives, it would establish a large exception
to the general rule of community property.
Second, there is no perceivable legal reason for use of the
presumption in New Mexico. In one line of precedents from
community property jurisdictions, the presumption of gift of
community funds to the wife was borrowed from the common
law, and seems to have been used simply because judges trained
in common law property principles confused them with basic
principles of community property. 61 The presumption, it should
be noted, is in accord with the common law separate property
system, for, under it, a husband owns all property earned by him
as his separate property in which the wife has no legal interest
during his lifetime. Thus, if property is purchased by a husband
with his separate funds, but title to the property is placed in his
wife's name, it is probable that a gift to the wife was in fact
intended. Obviously, such reasoning is out of place in a
community property system under which each spouse owns a
vested one-half interest in all property acquired by the other
during marriage.
In a second line of precedents, from California, whose cases
were expressly followed by the New Mexico court in August, the
presumption of gift was utilized to "vest" an interest in community property in the wife. At the time of the original California
decision announcing the presumption, a wife in California had
only an "expectancy" in community property, not the present,
vested interest which wives held in New Mexico when August,
was decided. 62 This reasoning also is patently inapplicable to
New Mexico.
Finally, retaining such a presumption and extending it to both
spouses has the practical effect of stripping a spouse of his or her
interest in community property after the spouse dies or becomes
unavailable to testify as to his or her actual intent regarding title
to the property. Because of this, where there is no evidence of
intent and the actual intent of an absent spouse is in doubt, it is
more equitable to simply leave both spouses with a one-half
interest in the property in question.
To preclude the possibility of extension of the presumption of
61. De Funiak and Vaughn. supra n. 16, §60.1.
62. Clark, supra note 53, at 156-157.
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gift to both spouses by the New Mexico Supreme Court under an
Equal Rights Amendment, the New Mexico Legislature should
specifically negate the presumption in any general treatment of
the community property statutes. 63
B. Earnings of the Wife While Living Separately from the
Husband
The provisions of N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-3-7 (1953) also
constitute a clear violation of the Equal Rights Amendment. That
section provides that:
The earnings and accumulations of the wife and of her minor
children living with her or in her custody, while she is living
separate from her husband, are the separate property of the wife.

There is no corresponding provision concerning the earnings of
the husband when the spouses are living separately; his earnings
remain community property under the general presumption of
community property contained in the first clause of § 57-4-1.
Accordingly, this section, like the presumptions just discussed,
patently discriminates against husbands in New Mexico and will
be unconstitutional under an Equal Rights Amendment.
As now worded, the section applies equally to couples who live
apart by mutual choice, and to couples who are separated
because one of them abandoned the other. Because the two
situations present different policy problems, possible treatment of
each under an Equal Rights Amendment will be discussed
separately below.
1. Spouses Living Apart by Choice
Section 57-3-7 enacted in New Mexico in 1907, is a verbatim
copy of an 1870 California statute to the same effect. 64 At its
inception, when practically no married women worked outside
the home for compensation, it may have been intended to serve
as a protection for wives deserted by their husbands and forced to
63. Presumptions which should be retained in any revised community property system in New
Mexico include two which are basic to all community property systems: 1) the presumption that
all property acquired during marriage by either spouse is community property; and 2) the
presumption that the separate property of either spouse which is commingled with the other
spouse's separate property or with community property becomes community property. For a
discussion of these two presumptions, see De Funiak and Vaughn, supra note 16 at §§ 60 and 67.
64. See Laws 1907, ch. 37, § 13 and Cal. Civ. Code § 169, enacted by Stats, 1869-70, ch. 161 p.
226, §2, repealed by Stats. 1969, ch. 1608, p. 1313, 53, and reenacted by Stats. 1969, ch. 1608, p.
3340, § 8 and recodified as Cal. Civ. Code § 5118 (West 1970).
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work to support themselves and their children. 65 Although the
New Mexico Supreme Court held in 1947 that the provision did
not constitute a violation of due process, 66 it strikes even the most
casual on-looker in 1972 as arbitrary and unfair to husbands.
Several factors point toward simple repeal of the section as it
applies to couples who are living apart by choice, leaving the
general presumption of community property intact unless a
would otherwise
couple agrees between themselves to treat what
67
property.
separate
as
be community property
The first important consideration is that the basic marital
property policy of the state has been declared to be that of
community, not separate, property. In an era when many
marriages end in divorce, trial separations and separations for
short periods are exceedingly common. To declare by statute that
each time a couple voluntarily separated, their earnings automatically became separate property would be philosophically at
odds with the basic tenet of a community property system-that
all property earned during marriage belongs to the community.
On this ground alone, retention and expansion of the provision to
include the husband's earnings is undesirable.
Second, defining marital property as "separate" as of the
moment spouses begin living apart would cause innumerable
complex accounting problems, both upon divorce and upon
reconciliation. Rather than cause such complications by statute in
all cases where a couple has separated, it would be better to leave
community property the rule, allowing couples who affirmatively
choose to adopt separate property as their marital property
system to do so by agreement between themselves under a statute
similar to the present N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 57-2-6 and 57-2-12
(1953).68

Third, inserting a provision which defines property as "separate," rather than community, from the moment a couple begins
living physically separated will not make all such couples treat
their property as separate property. The majority of married
couples will probably continue to treat their income as communi65. It will be recalled that, even in 1890, some twenty years after this provision was enacted in
California, only 8.7% of all women in the United States worked outside the home, and the
percentage of married women who were employed was undoubtedly far lower than that. See
supra note 3.
66. Loveridge v. Loveridge, 52 N.M. 353, 198 P.2d 444 (1947).
67. See discussion of the desirability of such a provision infra at notes 68-69.
68. See text accompanying note 113 infra.
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ty, at least if they have children to support and care for. Further,
most couples who separate without the advice of an attorney
probably would have no notion that by the simple act of physical
separation they had converted what would have been the
community property of both into the separate property of each.
Finally, the Legislature should re-enact what appears to have
been the intent of N.M. Stat. Ann. §§57-2-6 and 57-2-12 (1953) to
allow married couples to, in effect, opt out of the community
property system at any time before or during marriage that they
mutually wish to do So. 6 9 Such a provision would offer couples
the greatest flexibility to arrange their marital property holdings
in the manner which best suits their individual needs.
For these reasons, the best means of correcting the inequality
now presented by § 57-3-7, supra, is to simply repeal the
provision as it applies to couples living apart by choice. 70
2. Spouses Living Apart Because One Abandoned the Other
§ 57-3-7 apparently would apply to render the wife's earnings
her separate property when she is living separate from her
husband where either one of them has abandoned the other.
Although the statute seems to have been aimed at giving separate
property status to the wife's earnings where the husband
abandoned her, it would also seem to have that effect in a case
where she abandoned him. 71
The husband's earnings, however, remain community property
when the parties are living separately, regardless of whether he
abandoned his wife or she abandoned him. The New Mexico
Supreme Court so held in Beals v. Ares, 72 refusing to follow
Spanish law to the effect that a wife who abandoned her husband
thereby forfeited her rights in community property. 73 Under
69. See Laws 1907, ch. 37, § 5, to this effect. The section, however, was given a very restrictive
interpretation by the New Mexico Supreme Court. See note 113 infra.
70. Such a course would be a departure from the original Spanish law, which held that where
married couples lived apart by mutual consent and without wrongdoing by either party,
the
property acquired by each during the separation was not shared in by the other as community
property but was not the separate property of each spouse. De Funiak and Vaughn, supra note
16,
§ 57, n. 30.
71. The question has never been decided in New Mexico, but the California Supreme Court
held that the predecessor California statute, former Cal. Civ. Code § 169 (now Cal. Civ.
Code
§ 5118 (West Supp. 1972)), rendered the earnings of a wife who, through her own fault,
lived
separate from her husband, her separate property, while the husband's earnings remained
community property. Spreckels v. Spreckels, 116 Cal. 339, 342, 48 P. 228. 229 (1897). See
also
Makeig v. United Security Bank and Trust Co., 112 Cal. App. 138, 143. 296 P. 673. 675 (1931 ).
72. 25N.M.459, 185 P. 780(1919).
73. De Funiak and Vaughn, supra note 16 at § 189.
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Beals, it would appear that in New Mexico, unlike at least one
other community property state, 74 a wife who unjustifiably
abandons her husband retains her rights in the community
property acquired both before and after her abandonment. In
this situation also, then, a patent violation of the Equal7 5Rights
Amendment is presented by the current New Mexico law.
This inequality may be corrected by: 1) drafting a new statute
in sex-neutral terms which will declare that property of an
abandoned spouse acquired after abandonment becomes that
spouse's separate property, not community property; 2) repealing
the present § 57-3-7 establishing separate property status for the
earnings of a wife living separately from her husband, leaving the
general presumption of community property to apply to earnings
of both the abandoned spouse and the abandoning spouse; or 3)
enacting a new statute declaring that the earnings of both spouses
after one has has abandoned the other are separate, not
community property. Although the choice is a very difficult one,
the first alternative is believed the fairest.
A statute declaring the earnings of an abandoned spouse after
abandonment to be his or her separate property, while the
earnings of the abandoning spouse remain community property,
is clearly designed to protect the abandoned spouse's interests.
An abandoned spouse may postpone getting a divorce for a
variety of reasons-children, religion, or hope that the other
spouse will return. If in the meantime, years slip by, basic
considerations of fairness should prevent the abandoning spouse
from returning and claiming a one-half interest in the abandoned
74. Id. at § 190 citing Pendleton v. Brown, 25 Ariz. 604, 221 P. 213 (1923).
75. The question of whether earnings of each spouse acquired after a) abandoning the other;
or b) being abandoned by the other should become separate property or remain community
property should not be confused with the duty to support after abandonment. N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 57-2-4 (1953) provides, as to support, that a husband who has been unjustifiably abandoned by
his wife need no longer support her.
This section was, like the rest of the New Mexico community property statutes, copied directly
from a California statute to the same effect. See Cal. Civ. Code § 5131 (West, 1970). After the
California Supreme Court held in Randolph v. Randolph, 118 Cal. App. 2d 584, 258 P.2d 547
(1953) that a husband's earnings during the twenty-two years his wife abandoned him remained
community property in which she had a one-half interest, the California Legislature amended
the Cal. Civ. Code. The amended § 175 provides that a husband's earnings after abandonment
by his wife are his separate property in order to roughly correlate to what is now Cal. Civ. Code
§ 5118 (West, 1970) giving separate property status to the wife's earnings when she is living
separately from the husband for any reason. See note 71 supra, and Marital Property: Husband's
Earningsafter Abandonment by Wife are His Separate Estate: Civil Code Section 1.75 As A mended,
43 Cal. L. Rev. 691 (1955).
The New Mexico Legislature has never made a similar amendment to N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-3-7
(Repl. 1962).
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spouse's earnings and property accumulated in the interim. It is
recognized that the problems which accompany any statutory
rule establishing separate property automatically upon the happening of some event-including complicated accounting, and the
likelihood of public ignorance of the law-are present here, just
as they are where the spouses have separated voluntarily. Here,
however, the need to protect the abandoned spouse may
outweigh those considerations.
The argument against such a rule, of course, is that because the
abandoning spouse's earnings will remain community property, it
gives the abandoned spouse something of a windfall. His or her
earnings automatically become separate property, while a onehalf interest is retained in the earnings of the abandoning spouse.
If this consideration weighs heavily with the Legislature, it will in
effect be telling an abandoned spouse that legal action is the only
means available to protect earnings from a claim made years
later by the abandoning spouse; and it will be telling the spouse
who abandons a marriage rather than seeking a legal termination
that no penalty will be extracted for that action.
At the heart of the choice is the issue whether community
property law should be used as a tool for punishment of a spouse
who chooses to abandon a marriage rather than seek a divorce
when the marriage is no longer viable. Because both of the other
alternatives in effect encourage a spouse who is dissatisfied with a
marriage to abandon the other and thereby escape the responsibility of seeking a divorce and making arrangements for the
support of any children, it is believed that the first choice is
preferable.
If a statute is adopted declaring the earnings of an abandoned
spouse his or her separate property, but leaving the earnings of
the abandoning spouse community property, two sub-issues
remain.
The first is whether the statute should cover only those
earnings and property acquired after abandonment, or whether
the abandoning spouse should forfeit all interest in the community property, as the original Spanish law held. 76 While an
argument can be made that abandonment is such a serious
breach of marital relations that the abandoning spouse should
thereby lose all rights to all property of the community, such a
76. De Funiak and Vaughn, supra note 16 at .§ 189.
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position seems unnecessarily punitive. Upon abandonment,
under the statute suggested here, the abandoning spouse's
earnings will remain community property, while the abandoned
spouse's earnings will become that spouse's separate property.
This provision seems punishment enough: all rights to property
acquired before the abandonment and while the marriage was
functioning should not have to be forfeited. also.
The second issue is whether the statute should be drafted in
terms of "unjustifiable abandonment", as is customary. 77 This
practice may have arisen because, in earlier days, the difficulty of
obtaining a divorce made abandonment the only practical means
of escape from an impossible marital situation. Under such
statutes, a spouse who "justifiably" abandoned the other thus
retained rights to support and to a share in the other spouse's
property acquired after the abandonment. Today, however, when
divorce or separation is available it is hard to understand why
any abandonment, for any reason, should be "justifiable." If a
marital situation is intolerable, a spouse should be required by
the law not to abandon the other, but to take legal action. There
is no reason, in 1972, to draft laws which, in effect, encourage a
spouse to leave a marriage, and possible children, in limbo; the
law should penalize any spouse who abandons the other, whether
the abandoned spouse was the cause of abandonment or not.
C. Property Purchasedon Separate Credit of One of the Spouses7 8
The New Mexico Supreme Court held in Morris v. Waring
that property purchased on the separate credit of the wife was her
separate property. The Court based its conclusion largely on the
provisions of N.M. Stat. Ann § 57-4-2(1953), which provides:
The property of the community is not liable for the contracts of the
wife, made after marriage unless secured by a pledge or mortgage
thereof executed by the husband.

Because under this section a wife cannot legally contract a
community debt without her husband's consent, the court
reasoned that any debt contracted by the wife alone must be her
separate debt, not a community debt, and that property purchased thereby is her separate property, not community property.
In McElyea v. McElyea, however, the Court held that the
77. See. e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-2-4(Repl. 1962) and Cal. Civ. Code §5131 (West 1970).
78. 22 N.M. 175, 159 P. 1002(1916).
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husband's personal credit is presumptively exercised for the
benefit of the community, and property purchased on his
personal credit is therefore presumptively community property;7 9
the presumption may be overcome by evidence which establishes
that a separate, not a community, debt was intended.
The different rules of Morris and McElyea for property
purchased on the credit of the wife and husband thus violate the
Equal Rights Amentment. 80 These rules often become important
where the questions are: first, whether a community or separate
debt has been created by a purchase; and second, which
property, community or separate, is liable for the debt. Because
of this, the enactment of new statutes in the debt area precisely
defining the meaning of "separate" and "community" debts and
setting forth the property from which such debts may be satisfied
will go far toward solving the Equal Rights problem presented in
this area. 8 '
Resolution of the problem will also be affected by action taken
by the Legislature in the management and control area of the
community property statutes, since the Morris v. Waring decision,
which created the inequality, is based entirely on the existence of
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-4-2 (1953). If the proposals made in a later
part of this paper are accepted and a joint and several management system is adopted, § 57-4-2 denying married women the
right to contract and bind the community, will necessarily be
repealed, and with it, the Morris decision. Under a management
system in which wives as well as husbands may contract and bind
the community, the courts should treat purchases by wives as
they have treated purchases by husbands under the rule announced in McElyea-the separate credit of both will be presumptively
exercised for the benefit of the community. 82
MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY

The

present

New

Mexico community property statutes

79. 49 N.M. 322, 163 P.2d 635 (1945).
80. See cases cited supra note 60 establishing that court decisions constitute state action which
violates the Equal Protection Clause and which will violate the Equal Rights Amendment.
81. 3ee suggestions made for revision of the debt and credit provisions of the New Mexico
community property statutes in Ellis, supra note 9.
82. Some community property states make a distinction between credit based on separate
collateral put up for a debt and credit personal to one of the spouses. For a discussion of the
different approaches which other community property states have taken in the area of personal
credit and whether it is exercised on behalf of the community or the separate estate of the
debtor-spouse, see De Funiak and Vaughn, supra note 16, at §78.
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generally vest the power of control and disposition of community
personalty in the husband alone, but require the wife to join in
execution of "deeds and mortgages affecting real estate."' 83 We
will describe the management and control of personal community property and real community property under the present
system, and then consider the desirability of various alternatives
which would satisfy the requirements of an Equal Rights
Amendment.
By statute, the husband in New Mexico:
has the management and control of personal property of the
community, and during coverture, the husband [has] the sole power
other
of disposition of the personal property of the community,
84
than testamentary, as he has of his separate estate.

A second statute provides that if the husband fails to support the
wife, third parties may supply her with "articles necessary for her
support" and recover the cost thereof from the husband.85 Yet a
third statute provides that community property is not liable for
the husband has
contracts of the wife made after marriage unless
86
debt.
the
for
mortgage
or
executed a pledge
Two recent additions to the New Mexico statutes restrict the
otherwise almost plenary management and control powers of the
husband over community personal property. N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 57-4-10, (1953) enacted in an attempt to forestall a contrary
decision in Denton v. Fireman's Fund Indem. Co. 87, requires the
signature of both spouses to pledge community property on any
contract of indemnity. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 48-17-49 (1953) requires
the signature of both to pledge wages or execute a lien on
household furniture.
From a quick reading of the 1907 New Mexico statutes, one
would think that a married woman in New Mexico has no power
to bind the community for purchases of any sort unless her
husband fails to support her and her purchases constituted
"necessaries." This is clearly not the case. Aside from the obvious
Equal Rights problems, the New Mexico statutes governing
83. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-4-3 (Repl. 1962).
84. Id.
85. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-2-3 (Repl. 1962).
86. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-4-2 (Repl. 1962).
87. 357 F.2d 747 (10th Cir. 1966). This case held that the entire community property was liable
for some $440,000, where the husband alone had guaranteed, for a small consideration, the note
of a person who subsequently went bankrupt.
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management power over personal community property should be
amended to reflect the true status of married women today.
As to real property, § 57-4-3 requires the signatures of both
spouses in "all deeds and mortgages affecting real estate." The
New Mexico Supreme Court, interpreting this section, has held
that a lease for a term of years is not a "deed." The husband
alone, therefore, may lease community real property for a term of
years; 88 the signature of both spouses is required to lease
property for an indefinite term.8 9 The Court has also held that a
mortgage given simultaneously with the purchase of real property, commonly called a "purchase-money mortgage", is not the
"mortgage" referred to in the statute. Instead, it is treated
as
though the purchase did not include the portion of the property
mortgaged. 90 Consequently, the Court held that the husband
alone may execute a purchase-money mortgage in New Mexico
without the wife'sjoinder.
The requirement of joinder to convey a valid interest in
community real property in New Mexico is so rigid that a
conveyance made by only one spouse is completely void and
ineffective to convey either that spouse's interest in the property
or the entire property, should the conveying spouse subsequently
acquire it.91
While the wife's signature is clearly necessary to convey or
mortgage community real property, several New Mexico decisions have intimated, though not held directly, that the husband
has full power to manage the property for the community. 92
Under present law, the wife in New Mexico has a clear right to
manage community property only if she has been appointed
head of the community by a district court under certain special
circumstances. 93 If she is a wage-earner and lives with her
88. Fidel v. Venner, 35 N.M. 45, 289 P. 803 (1930).
89. Terry v. Humphreys. 27 N.M. 564, 203 P. 539 (1922); Grafe v. Delgado, 30 N.M. 150, 228
P. 601 (1924).
90. Davidson v. Click, 31 N.M. 543, 249 P. 100 (1926). For a defense of this reasoning, see
Rappeport, The Husband's Power of Management of Community Real Property, I Ariz. L. Rev. 13
at41 (1959).
91. McGrail v. Fields, 53 N.M. 158, 203 P.2d 1000 (1949), and Jenkins v. Huntsinger, 46 N.M.
168, 125 P.2d 327(1942).
92. See Davidson v. Click 31 N.M. 543, 249 P. 100(1926-; El Paso Cattle Loan Co. v. Stephens
and Gardnes, 30 N.M. 154, 228 P. 1076 (1924). While the Court in Frkovich v. Petranovich, 48
N.M. 382, 151 P.2d 337 (1944) expressly declined to decide whether the husband in fact had a
right superior to the wife's to manage community real property, in Fidel v. Verner 35 N.M. 45,
289 P. 803 (1930) it expressed no doubt that the husband had the power to manage community
real property. See also De Funiak and Vaughn, supra note 16, at § 115.1.
93. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-4-5 to -9 (Repl. 1962). The wife who is appointed head of the
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husband, she has no statutory right to manage her own wages,
since her earnings are personal property and her husband is, by
94
statute, the sole manager of the community personal property.
In this respect, a married woman in New Mexico today is in a
worse position than an unmarried 18-year-old of either sex, who
under the Age of Majority Act passed by the 1971 New Mexico
Legislature, 95 has full powers to 96contract and to control and
dispose of his or her own earnings.
Quite obviously, the Equal Rights Amendment will require
drastic change in this area. Assuming that the state retains a
community property system, there are essentially four options
available for regulating the management and control of community property. These are: (1) a joint management system; (2) an
unlimited joint and several management system; (3) a limited
joint and several management system which requires joint
decisions for certain sales or purchases; and (4) a separate
management system.
The merits and disadvantages of each of these will be discussed
in turn below.
A. Joint Management
One method of providing both spouses with equal powers of
management and control of community property is to provide
that the spouses have joint, but not several, powers of control and
disposition over community property. This solution would carry
the present joinder requirement in New Mexico for "deeds and
mortgages affecting real estate" 9 7 to an extreme by requiring, in
effect, a joint decision and agreement on all conveyances,
contracts and debts made on behalf of the community. In spite
of two obvious problems which immediately come to mindpossible impasse between the spouses and extreme inefficommunity under these sections has only the same powers as a husband had under N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 57-4-3, and does not thereby acquire the power to convey or mortgage community realty
without joinder of the husband or his guardian. Frkovich v. Petranovich, 48 N.M. 382, 151 P.2d
337, 155 A.L.R. 295 (1944).
94. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-4-3 (Repl. 1962).
95. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-13-1 (Supp. 1971).
96. However, it is possible that the wife in New Mexico may gain the right to manage her own
wages if her husband appoints her agent of the community for that purpose. Although no New
Mexico case has decided the point, other courts have held such an agency valid and legally
binding. See De Funiak and Vaughn, supra note 16, at § 114 and cases cited therein.
97. See discussion of this provision in present law supra at notes 89-94. Suggestions for
improving present law in this regard are contained below at notes 125-133.
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ciency 98 -one

major community property state recently adopted a
variant of a joint management system, at least with regard to
certain categories of community property.
In 1967, Texas enacted a new Matrimonial Property Act 99
which provides that, while earnings and other property acquired
after marriage are community property, each spouse has the right
to sole management and control of property "that he or she
would have owned if single." 0 Thus, if each spouse is working
for a salary, each has the sole right to manage and control his or
her own earnings without interference from the other spouse. In
this respect, a separate management system is in force in Texas.
The Act further provides, however, that:
if community property subject to the sole management, control and
disposition of one spouse is mixed or combined with community
property subject to the sole management, control, and disposition
of the other spouse, then the mixed or combined community
property is subject to the joint management control,and dispositionof

the spouses, unless the spouses provide otherwise by power of
attorney, or other agreement in writing.101 (Emphasis added.)

Commingled community property in Texas is therefore subject to
the joint control of both spouses.
Under any joint management system, third parties can be
protected in dealings with the community by only two means:
requiring joinder of both spouses for all transactions; or by the
enactment of a statutory presumption declaring that all property
held in the name of one spouse may be validly conveyed by that
spouse alone. Under present law in New Mexico, which, as we
have seen, requires joinder of both spouses to convey community
real property, both of these methods are in use today. Where
property, is held in the wife's name alone, a conclusive
presumption contained in § 57-4-1102 that the property is her
98. See Rappeport, The Husband's Power of Management of Community Real Property,
supra

note 91, at 59 for a discussion of these problems.
99. This act, adopted only after pressure from women's rights groups to adopt an Equal Rights
Amendment to the Texas Constitution, was a compromise between that extreme posture, which
had been overwhelmingly defeated in a poll of the Texas Bar, and doing nothing. See McKnight,

Recodification of MatrimonialPropertyLaws, 29 Tex. B. J. 1000 (1966) and The Family
Code-Has
it Substantially Changed Marital Property Rights in Texas?, 9 Houston L. Rev. 120,
124 (1971).

The 1967 Act was amended slightly in 1969 and recodified. Act 1969, 61st Leg., Chap. 888 (Texas).
See McSwain, Revision of Marital Rights Statutes, 31 Tex. B.J. 1013 (1968) for a description of
the
amendments.
100. Tex. Family Code § 5.22 (Pamphlet 1972).
101.

Id.

102. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-4-1 (Repl. 1962) provides in relevant part that property conveyed to
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separate property protects third parties. Because there is no such
presumption as to real property held in the name of the husband
New Mexico require
alone, prudent buyers of real property10 in
3
joinder of the wife in all such instances.
In Texas, a statutory presumption was enacted to overcome the
problems of slowing commercial transactions which the other
option, obtaining joinder of both spouses, presents. The Texas
presumption provides in relevant part that:
(a) During marriage, property is presumed to be subject to the sole
management, control, and disposition of a spouse if it is held in his
or her name, as shown by muniment, contract, deposit of funds, or
other evidence of ownership, or if it is in his or her possession and is
not subject to such evidence of ownership.
(b) A third person dealing with a spouse is entitled to rely (as
against the other spouse or anyone claiming from that spouse) on
that spouse's authority to deal with the property if:
(1) the property is presumed to be subject to the sole
management, control, and disposition of the spouse; and
(2) the person dealing with the spouse:
(A) is not a party to a fraud upon the other spouse or
another person; and
does not have notice of the spouse's lack of
(B)
10 4
authority.

The enactment of a presumption allowing disposition of commingled community property by one spouse alone, immediately after
providing that such property shall be subject to the joint
management of the spouses, makes one wonder why the Texas
Legislature chose to enact a joint management system initially.
Aside from the philosophic difficulty, however, two areas of
potential problems are presented by the Texas presumption.

that
a married woman by an instrument in writing is presumed to be her separate property, and
good
in
dealing
person
any
of
favor
in
conclusive
are
mentioned
section
this
in
"the presumptions
or
faith and for valuable consideration with any such married woman or her legal representative
See discussion of the presumptions contained in this section supra at
successor in interest .
notes 41-43.
his
103. Thus, the New Mexico husband today is severely hindered if he attempts to sell
tracing
and
search
title
elaborate
an
without
for
marriage,
during
acquired
property
separate real
of funds used to purchase the property, buyers must presume, in accordance with the provisions
of N.M. Stat. Ann § 57-4-1 (Repl. 1962) that the property is community property. Buyers will thus,
as a practical matter, routinely require the joinder of the wife in all instances where real property
held in the husband's name alone is conveyed or mortgaged; the difficulties of determining the
true status of the property as separate or community are simply too great.
notes
See discussion of suggestions for improving the present situation infra at
125-133.
104. Tex. Family Code § 5.24 (Pamphlet 1972).
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As to personal property not evidenced by a document of title, it
allows a spouse to deal with it without joining the other spouse if
the property is "in his or her possession." Many situations can be
imagined in which "possession" is a hard concept to apply. Does
a spouse who purports to sell the couch from the living room of
the joint dwelling "possess" the couch? Does a rancher purporting to convey good title to a herd of cattle scattered over the
range "possess" the cattle? Does he "possess" them if they are in
a truck which the rancher is driving? 105
In countless situations then, a prudent buyer would request
joinder of both spouses before purchasing personal property not
evidenced by a document of title, and thereby defeat the major
purpose of the presumption-to speed commercial transactions.
Litigation will also undoubtedly arise concerning the quality of
"notice" sufficient to make a third party purchasing
from one
spouse aware of that spouse's "lack of authority" to convey. Does
a close friend who has known both spouses for thirty years, know
they both worked for many years, and is quite sure neither ever
had any separate property have "notice" that the spouse in whose
name title to real property is held alone has no authority to
convey it withoutjoinder of the other spouse? Does such a person
have a duty to trace the source of funds used to purchase the
property? To simply inquire whether the property is community
or separate? The prudent friend here, like the prudent buyer
from a spouse in "possession" of personal property, will simply
ask that both spouses join in any conveyance, again defeating the
purpose of the presumption.
This problem could be cured by making the presumption
conclusive, rather than rebuttable, where title to property is held
in the name of one spouse alone.106 A conclusive presumption
would not, however, solve the first problem discussed-where
personal property is in the "possession of one spouse-since the
content of the term "possession" would always be open to
litigation. In that area, joinder of both spouses would be required
in every case in which the meaning of "possession" was
doubtful. 107
105. See Hudspeth. The Matrimonial Property Act of 1967-Six Areas of Change,
31 Tex. B.J.
477 at 559 (1968).
106. See infra at notes 125-127 where this suggestion is made should the
joinder requirement
for the conveyance of real property be retained in New Mexico.
107. The Texas statute apparently make a joint bank account between
spouses a legal
impossibility unless both spouses sign all checks drawn on the account,
or unless each
affirmatively appoints the other his or her agent as to transactions entered
on the account. Since
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Beyond the technical problems presented by the Texas statute,
any system of jofnt management of community property is
objectionable because of its underlying philosophical notions
about the nature of marriage. A joint management system
requiring consultation and agreement between the spouses for all
transactions presumes that bad faith and lack of trust are the
norm for the majority of married couples in the jurisdiction. Such
a system assumes that married people need the force of state law
to protect them from each other, or, alternatively, to force them
to consult with each other. These assumptions about the nature
of marriage are unwarranted and unsupported by any evidence.
The evidence available, in fact, tends to suggest just the
opposite-that most married couples do consult on all important
decisions even where, as now, the law gives the husband an
almost absolute power to control and dispose of personal
property. 108 Further, the only state which has enacted a joint
management system recognized its essential unworkability by
also enacting a presumption which allows separate management
where title is held in the name of one spouse, or where one
spouse possesses personal property. As the Texas experience
illustrates, to be feasible, a joint management system must find
some means of exempting everyday transactions from its requirement-thus vastly undercutting its scope and providing, in effect,
for joint and several, not joint, management. In those situations
where joint management is required, it will significantly slow the
pace of commercial transactions. Joint management for all is a
cumbersome means of protecting the few with dishonest or
arbitrary mates.
The problem of impasse is also a serious one. If such a system
were to be adopted, a provision for court arbitration of some sort
should be considered to cover the situation where one spouse
unreasonably refuses to assent to a particular transaction.
For these reasons, a joint management system is undesirable as
a means of insuring the spouses' equality in management of
community property.
money in a joint bank account would be under the spouses' joint control, the provisions of Tex.
Family Code § 5.24 (Pamphlet 1972), allowing disposal by one spouse where it is under his or her
separate control, would not apply, thus requiring joint management by both spouses. Even if the
spouses had appointed each other agents for transactions on the account, some mechanism for
notifying third parties of the fact, such as imprinting checks to that effect, would have to be found
before third parties could safely accept a check drawn on a joint account but signed by only one
spouse.
108. See text at notes 84-87 supra.
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B. Joint and Several Management
A second approach to equal management powers is to provide
that either spouse acting alone, or both together, may fully bind,
dispose of, and control the entire community property. The
spouses under such a system would have joint and several
management powers, somewhat analogous to the powers exercised by each partner in a commercial partnership. a09 Philosophy,
present custom, and common sense all dictate the choice of this
system or some variant of it.
A system of joint and several management has as its underlying premise the assumption that each spouse is of equal
competence to make decisions affecting community property. It
presumes trust and communication between the spouses. Just as
the notion basic to business partnerships is that each partner will
consult with the other before taking any action of major
importance, the joint and several management concept in the
marriage arena assumes that the spouses will similarly consult
and agree.
Beyond its philosophy, however, a form of a joint and several
management system is attractive because it is, in fact, the system
by which most married couples today handle family finances. 110
A trip to any shopping center will reveal that, while New Mexico
statutory law gives the husband almost absolute power to dispose
of community personal property, in fact New Mexico wives
manage and control a large portion of community wealth with
the complete consent of their husbands, and no questions from
merchants. Statutory law notwithstanding, joint and several
managment of community property is unquestionably the practice in New Mexico today."'
There are two major arguments commonly made against the
109. The Uniform Partnership Act provides in this regard that "all partners have equal rights
in the conduct of the partnership business." See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-1-18(e) (2nd Repl. 1972).
Every partner is thus an agent of the partnership and may bind the partnership for all acts within
his apparent authority unless the partner in fact has no authority to do a certain act and the third
party with whom he is dealing knows of his lack of authority. See N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 66-1-9(1)
(2nd Repl. 1972).
110. Horne, Community Property-A Functional Approach, 24 S. Cal. L. Rev. 42, 61 (1950);
Friedmann, A Comparative Analysis, in Matrimonial Property Law 433,445 (1955).
111. The concept of agency between husband and wife is also well-established in New Mexico
case law. See, e.g., Holloway v. Evans, 55 N.M. 601, 238 P.2d 457 (1951); Woods v. Van Wallis
Trailer Co., 77 N.M. 121, 419 P.2d 964 (1966); and Warren v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 40 N.M. 253, 58
P.2d 1175 (1936). See also N.M. Stat. Ann. 57-2-6 (Repl. 1962), providing that husband and wife
may enter into any transaction with each other which they could if not married, subject to "the
general rules of the common law which control the actions of persons occupying confidential
relations with each other."
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institution of a system of joint and several management. One is
that if both spouses have legal authority to bind the entire
community, it is possible that they will make irresponsible or
contradictory decisions and bankrupt, or severely damage, the
112
community.
There are several answers to this. First, the overwhelming
majority of married couples consult closely concerning major
113
purchases, regardless of the legal system under which they live.
The fear, therefore, is that a very few will take action injurious to
their spouses and themselves. Legislating to protect this minority
by requiring joint management will severely hamper the vast
majority who competently and capably handle their monetary
affairs. The proper solution for the problem of those few spouses
who indulge in wild spending sprees which threaten the very
existence of the community lies not with the New Mexico
Legislature's enacting laws to restrain all of us-but with marriage counselors or divorce courts to aid the few who need it.
Second, if the fear is that under a joint and several management system one spouse will interfere with and damage the
operation of a community business normally managed by the
other spouse, a provision similar to the present N.M. Stat. Ann.
§§ 57-2-6 and 57-2-12 (1953) should be retained to enable the
spouses to contract between themselves, 114 and appoint one of
them sole manager of a designated portion of the community
property. If specific notice to this effect has been given to all
creditors and others with whom business is transacted, the spouse
operating the family business will have been effectively protected
against interference from the other spouse, should that be
perceived as a real possibility.
The second argument commonly made against an unlimited
joint and several management system is that it would allow one
spouse to contract debts or make purchases even though the
other had violently disagreed with the transaction in question; it
would also allow a spouse to obligate the community where the
purchase did not in fact benefit, or was in fraud of, the
community.
There are, again, several answers. One is that these problems
112. For an unconvincing argument to this effect, see Massfeller, Matrimonial Property Law in
Germany, in Matrimonial Property Law.380 (1955).
113. See authority cited in note 110, supra.
114. See discussion of such a provision supra at notes 68-69.
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are with us now and no one complains. A New Mexico husband
today may, at any time, obligate the community against the
express and deeply-held wishes of his wife. He may bind the
community even though it receives no benefit. 115 These objections, while valid, have not been considered serious enough to
generate enthusiasm for statutory change in the decades since the
present community property laws were enacted. That fact alone
is convincing evidence that the problem is one confined to an
extremely small number of couples.
A second answer, however, is to enact a statute allowing
spouses to bring suit against each other or their estates, during
marriage or on separation, divorce or death, for money owed.
While the traditional rule in the United States has been that, in
the interests of preserving marital harmony, no suits are allowed
between spouses, 116 such a rule seems too rigid today. If a spouse
is agitated enough to see a lawyer and file suit, the odds are not
good that the marriage is a stable one which would last if the suit
were barred by an arbitrary state policy against inter-spousal
suits. The rule, then, only inflicts injustice in an area where the
state really has very little interest.
If inter-spousal suits during marriage, as well as on the
dissolution of marriage, were allowed by statute, the grounds for
recovery should be carefully delineated. In line with current law,
recovery should be allowed for amounts spent from community
funds for the separate property of the defendent spouse' 17 and
for action taken in fraud of the community and the interests of
the suing spouse. 118 The Legislature should also consider allowing, as California court recently did, a spouse to recover his or
her interest in money lost in gambling1 19 and in other pursuits of
no possible value to the community. Under no circumstances,
however, should\ recovery be allowed where predicated only on
115. Denton v. Firemen's Fund Indem. Co., 357 F.2d 747 (10th Cir. 1966) presented precisely
this case. The Court held that even though the community had received no benefit from the
husband's contract of indemnity, it was liable for the full amount of the debt he created.
116. Lynn v. Gaskins, 212 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Ind. 1963): Ritter v. Ritter, 31 Pa. 396 (1858);
Drake v. Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 177 N.W. 624 (1920).
117. See Laughlin v. Laughlin, 49 N.M. 20, 155 P.2d 1010(1945).
118. See De Funiak and Vaughn, supra, note 16, at § 119 wherein the authors state that the
original Spanish law followed in most community property states today, allowed recovery by the
wife where the husband managed the community property in fraud of her interests.
119. Novo v. Del Rio Hotel, 141 Cal. App. 2d 304, 295 P.2d 576 (1956). See also the
commentaries on this case in 9 Stan. L. Rev. 400 (1957) and 30 S. Cal. L. Rev. 95 (1956). See also
De Funiak and Vaughn, supra note 16, at § 120 stating that recovery was allowed the wife for
"debauchery and dissolute living" by the husband if it was financed by community funds.
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bad business judgment of the other spouse or simple negligence
in handling the affairs of the community. Whether or not a
statute is enacted which specifically allows inter-spousal suits
during the continuance of the marriage, each of the grounds of
recovery set out above has been allowed in other community
property states at the dissolution of the marriage or from the
other spouse's estates upon death, and could easily be adopted by
New Mexico courts without any specific legislation on the
subject.
If the spouses are allowed to recover from each other for
egregious wrongs done in the management of community
property, it is difficult to see what other arguments remain
against the adoption of a joint and several management system
with no limitations. However, because many will feel that limits
of some sort are necessary where very large transactions are
involved, we will next consider possible limitations on a joint and
several management system.
C.. Joint and Several Management with Joinder of Both Spouses
Requiredfor Certain Transactions
Most will agree that while a joint and several management
system is commonly employed by both spouses for everyday
routine transactions, a form of joint management is used for
extraordinary purchases; the implicit assumption under which
normal marriages operate that the spouses will trust each other's
judgment in routine matters, but that each wishes to have a voice
in major decisions. While most couples will follow such a system
regardless of the formal management system adopted by a
jurisdiction, it may be desirable to require consultation on major
transactions by statute, both to express what the majority do as a
matter of course and to coerce the minority into consulting on
important decisions. Requiring the consent of both spouses on all
major decisions may also be desirable because, if the decision is
an important one monetarily, it carries with it the possibility of
financial harm to the community if the wrong decision is made.
In this area, then, the danger of impasse-and consequent
inaction-may be less than the dangers of rash action on the part
of one spouse alone. If a statute requiring joinder of the spouses
is considered necessary, it could take one of several forms. The
customary requirement in present law is that both spouses join in
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the conveyance on mortgage of the homestead 120 or of all real
property owned by the community. 121 An analogous, though not
customary, requirement would be to require joinder on purchases
as well as conveyances and mortgages of real property. A third
possibility, suggested because land is no longer the major source
of wealth that it was when the present joinder requirements were
instituted, is to require joinder of both spouses for all transactions
over a certain dollar amount, or a specified percentage of the
individual couple's income.
These suggestions, and concomitant statutes which should be
enacted if a particular limitation is chosen by the Legislature, will
be discussed in turn below.
1. Conveyance and Mortgage of Real Property
A joinder requirement in this area could take one of two
forms: joinder required only for the sale or mortgage of the
"homestead," the dwelling-place of the spouses; or a requirement
that the spouses join in all conveyances or mortgages of any
community real property.
The apparent rationale for requiring joinder only for conveyances of the spouses' home is to protect the wife from having her
house sold without her consent by a husband who has otherwise
complete control of the community assets. 122 Such a rationale
will not be consistent with a management system under which the
wife has an equal voice. The reason for requiring joinder under a
new system will be to insure that the spouses consult on, and that
both have agreed to, all major decisions affecting the community.
Thus, if a joinder requirement for real property is thought
necessary at all under an Equal Rights Amendment, it should not
be limited to the homestead.
The possibility remaining is to require the joinder of both
spouses where a conveyance or mortgage of any community real
property is made.
The underlying rationale of this requirement, too, however, is
120. Texas, for instance, has a statute requiring that both spouses join in the sale of the
homestead. Tex. Family Code §5.81 (Pamphlet 1972).
If other community real property is in the name of one spouse alone, and the buyer has no
notice that the property is community property, the spouse in whose name title is held may convey
it without joinder of the other spouse. See discussion of Texas management statutes infra at notes
132-133, 141.
121. See, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-4-3 (Repl. 1962).
122. Tex. Fam. Code § 5.81 referred to in note 120 supra, was enacted in 1921, when the
husband in Texas had full control over all other community property.
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open to question. As one author recently pointed out concerning
the present Arizona joinder requirement:
The present law distinguishes between real and personal property
with no value differential. The wife and husband must both sign a
conveyance of a small parcel of relatively worthless desert land, but
an order to sell valuable common stock, or an application to
borrow money needs only the signature of the husband. Real
property may have been considered inherently more important
once, but this distinction is less realistic today. Requiring both
signatures on all large transactions would give protection to both
spouses. 123

To provide real protection for those few spouses who will not be
consulted by their mates in major decisions, and to ensure
consultation on all important transactions, a dollar amount or a
percentage of the couple's income could theoretically be established above which neither could spend without the other's
consent-although the problems of this approach are considerable, as we shall see.
An important factor to be weighed in deciding the need for
and desirability of a joinder requirement is the impact it will have
on commerce and the pace of commercial transactions. While
such a requirement might seriously hamper the expeditious sale
of common stock-and would probably provoke many couples
into appointing one or the other of them an agent of the
community for that purpose-it is unlikely to have much effect in
real property transactions, which are usually quite slow due to
the need for title searches and title insurance. Thus a joinder
requirement confined to this area is less cumbersome and
correspondingly less objectionable than a broader requirement
would be.
On balance, while the requirement of joinder for conveyances
and mortgages of real property will affect the decision-making
process of an extremely small number of couples in New
Mexico-since most will consult anyway-it is also not a serious
burden on the majority.
If the requirement is retained, it should be worded in
substantially the same terms as present law in order to insure that
the interpretations given N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-4-3 (1953) will
remain.124
123. Community Property: Male Management and Women's Rights, 1972 Law and the Social
Order 163, 173.
124. See the brief discussion at notes 88-92 supra for the major cases which have interpreted
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Further, the Legislature should enact statutes in two areas to
cover specific problems which accompany any joinder requirement for the sale of real property. Each of these will be discussed
below.
a. Conclusive Presumption Effective as to Third Parties to
Whom Property is Conveyed that Property Held in the
Name of One Spouse Alone May be Conveyed by that
Spouse.
As discussed earlier,' 2 5 such a presumption now exists in New
Mexico as to property held in the name of wives alone; there is
no corresponding provision for property held by New Mexico
husbands.
Without such a presumption, title insurors and buyers purchasing real property held in the name of one spouse would be forced
to go through an elaborate procedure of tracing funds used to
purchase the property in order to ascertain whether property was
in fact the separate property of one spouse or community
property for which joinder was necessary. As a practical matter, a
cautious buyer or insuror will simply require joinder of both
spouses as a matter of course. This presumption, then, is needed
to allow a spouse who owns separate property to sell that
property without joinder of the other.' 2 6
Such a presumption will necessarily make it possible for a
spouse to sell community real property without joinder of the
other spouse, in contravention of the policy of the joinder
requirement, where the property is held in the selling spouse's
name alone. Protection for the non-title holding spouse could be
afforded by enacting a statute similar to a Washington provision 2 7 which allows a spouse to file of record a statement of his
or her interest in community real property held in the name of
the provisions of N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-4-3 (Rep] 1962). Under the well-established rule of
statutory construction that re-enactment of a statute after judicial decisions interpreting the statute
is taken as approval of the decision by the Legislature, the cases should stand under a new statute.
See Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 5109 (3d ed., Horack. 1943) and cases cited therein.
Particular care should be taken to re-enact the language of N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-4-3 (Repl.
1962) stating the conveyance in contravention of the section "shall be void and of no effect"
because the Court has relied on that wording in such cases as McGrail v. Fields, 53 N.M. 158, 203
P.2d 1000 (1949), and Jenkins v. Huntsinger. 46 N.M. 168, 125 P.2d 327 (1942).
125. See text at notes 103 and 104 supra.
126 See Knutson, California Community Property Laws: A Plea for Legislative Study and
Reform, 39 S. Cal. L. Rev. 240, 248 (1966) making the same suggestion for revision of the
California statutes which are, at present, virtually identical to those in New Mexico.
127. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 26.16.100(1961).
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the other spouse alone. When filed within ninety days after the
conveyance to the first spouse was recorded, such a statement
constitutes notice to third parties that the property in question is
community property which must be conveyed by both spouses.
Such a statute should be carefully drafted to be effective only
as to third parties purchasing property held in one spouse's name
alone. If the property is in fact community property, not the
separate property of the spouse in whose name it is held, the
other spouse must be free to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that, while the sale itself is valid, the proceeds of the
sale are community property, not the separate property of the
selling spouse.' 28
b. Statute Allowing Joinder Requirement to be Suspended
Where One Spouse Unavailable to Convey
A final important problem which must be dealt with if the
joinder requirement for conveyances of community real property
is retained is that of allowing one spouse alone to convey the
property where the other spouse is for any reason unavailable or
unable to join in a conveyance.
Present New Mexico law allows the wife to be appointed "head
of the community" and to manage community property where
the husband is incapacited. 129 It does not, however, permit the
conveyance of community real property without the joinder of the
husband or a guardian appointed to protect his interests. 130
Although no case has been decided on the question in New
Mexico, the language of the Court in Frkovich v. Petranovich
suggests that where the husband is a prisoner of war, missing in
action or the wife is simply ignorant of his whereabouts,
community real property cannot be conveyed by the wife
alone. 13 1
Thus, a new statute is necessary which provides for petition to
a district court, personal service if possible and service by
publication if the other spouse cannot be located, and final
adjudication giving either spouse power to convey good title to
community real property where the other is unavailable.' 32
128.
Ann. §
129.
130.
131.
132.

Such a provision would be similar to the last sentence of the presumption in N.M. Stat.
57-4-1 (Repl. 1962).
N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 57-4-5 to -9 (Repl. 1962).
Frkovich v. Petranovich, 48 N.M. 382, 151 P.2d 337, 155 A.L.R. 295 (1944).
Id.
Tex. Family Code § 5.25 (Pamphlet 1972) has provisions to this effect.
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Where the other spouse is absent because a prisoner of war or
missing in action, provision should be made for appointment of a
133
guardian to represent that spouse's interests.
2. JoinderRequiredfor Purchaseof Real Property
It is inconsistent to adopt a joinder requirement for mortgages
and conveyances of community real property, yet allow either
spouse to freely purchase real property on behalf of the community. If the notion of joinder is to protect one spouse from the
other's erroneous or fraudulent decisions, a lack of joinder on
purchases of real property can be as harmful to the community as
ill-considered decisions to sell. If the joinder requirement is
meant to require the spouses to consult on all major decisions
affecting the community, it is difficult to see why a decision to
purchase property is any less major than a decision to sell it. If
the requirement of joinder to convey and mortgage community
real property is retained, the additional requirement of joinder to
purchase real property should, logically, be added.
Such an addition would have the immediate consequence of
invalidating the holding of the New Mexico Supreme Court in
Davidson v. Click.134 That case held that a purchase-money
mortgage was not the "mortgage" for which joinder is required
by N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-4-3 (1953), reasoning that a mortgage
executed at the instant of purchase was analagous to not
purchasing the entire property, rather than mortgaging it after
ownership. Accordingly, a husband in New Mexico today can
execute a valid purchase-money mortgage without joining the
wife. A requirement that both spouses join in all contracts to
purchase real property would therefore undercut the rationale of
Davidson and would probably result in requiring the signatures
of both spouses to execute a valid purchase-money mortgage in
New Mexico.
The effect of a statute requiring joinder of both spouses to
purchase real property on behalf of the community will depend
on its precise wording. If the language found in N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 57-4-3 (1953) is used, and purchases without the signature of
both spouses are declared by statute to be "void and of no
effect," specific performance cannot be had against the spouse
133. See Tex. Family Code § 5.26 (Pamphlet 1972) making such provisions for prisoners of
war and soldiers whose status is listed as missing in action.
134. 31 N.M. 543,249 P. 100(1926).
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who did sign the purchase agreement,' 35 although damages for
breach of contract can probably be obtained. 136 Should the
spouse who signed the purchase agreement later become the sole
owner of the property, the purchase agreement will not take
effect at that time.' 37
A second possibility in drafting such a statute is to deliberately
avoid the operative language of the present § 57-4-3 and
specifically provide that if one spouse alone signs an agreement
to purchase real property on behalf of the community, the result
is that the signing spouse has made a separate contract to
purchase real property on behalf of himself or herself alone.
Under this form of the statute, specific performance could be
obtained against a spouse who agreed to purchase real property
and the debt would be collectible as any separate debt of either
spouse alone is collectible.
Because the first possible wording of such a statute defeats the
legitimate expectations of third parties who deal in good faith
with one spouse alone, and because the consequence of the
second alternative is simply that the signing spouse has purchased separate property which it is his or her separate responsiblilty to pay for, care should be taken to avoid tracking the
wording of § 57-4-3 if a joinder requirement for purchases of
community real property is enacted.
If the wording suggested here is adopted, a spouse will be able
to purchase separate property for himself or herself alone by
being the only spouse to sign a purchase agreement. If the first
alternative is adopted, however, a provision should be enacted
which will make it possible for spouses to purchase separate
property for themselves alone without joinder of the other
spouse.
3. Dollar Amount or Percentage of Income Limit Over Which
Joinder of Spouses Would be Required
Because land no longer represents the wealth that it did when
the original statutes requiring joinder of spouses to convey real
property were enacted, it has been suggested by some that the
requirement of joinder for transactions involving real property
135. Adams v. Blumenshine, 27 N.M. 643. 204 P. 66 (1922).
136. Viramontes v. Fox, 65 N.M. 275, 335 P.2d 1071 (1959); Conley v. Davidson, 35 N.M.
173 291 P. 489 (1930).
137. McGrail v. Fields, 53 N.M. 158, 203 P.2d 1000 (1949); Jenkins v. Huntsinger, 46 N.M.
168, 125 P.2d 327 (1942).
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should be replaced by a requirement that spouses agree on all
expenditures over a simple dollar amount. 138 While the suggestion is logical and would further the notion that couples should
consult and agree on all major decisions, not simply those
involving real property, institution of the requirement does not
seem practical for a number of reasons.
The first is the ease with which it could be evaded. No feasible
means could be found to prevent a spouse from charging to the
limit per day every day for a month without joinder of the other
spouse. Similarly, in order to avoid such a law, many couples
would simply file statements with creditors appointing one of
them an agent with full powers to manage and dispose of
community property. In fact, such a practice would seem
compelled by the exigencies of stock trading and other business
dealings.
In instances where the requirement was effective, it would slow
many commercial transactions drastically unless the figure
chosen were so high as to have very limited application.
Finally, of course, it would be extremely difficult to choose a
dollar amount which would serve well for lower-income as well
as upper-income couples. The $500 figure suggested by one
writer 139 might never be effective at all for couples in the bottom
third economically of the population. It might, however, catch
the top five percent every week or two, causing extreme
aggravation and many delays.
An amount established by a percentage of income would be
almost impossible for merchants to use. The net effect of such a
limitation would be either that merchants would require joinder
whenever in doubt in order to protect themselves, or that it would
be completely ignored, as the present management statutes are.
On balance, it does not seem that the protection of a tiny
minority of spouses which such a statute would afford justifies
applying it to the entire married population in the state, the
overwhelming majority of whom will consult on such decisions
without any prompting from the New Mexico Legislature.
D. Separate Management
In 1967 Texas established a system of separate management of
138. Community Property. Male Management and Women's Rights, supra note 123, at 173.
139. Id.
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that community property which had not been commingled with
other community property. The Texas statute provides:
a) During marriage, each spouse has the sole management,
control and disposition of the community property that he or she
would have owned if single, including but not limited to:
(1) personal earnings;
140
(2) revenue from separate property;
(3) recoveries for personal injuries;
(4) the increase and mutations of, and the revenue from, all
to his or her sole managment, control, and
property subject
14 '
disposition.

Although Texas is a community property state, this aspect of
the Texas management system operates very much like a separate
1 42
it
property system and is objectionable for the same reasons:
ignores the obvious fact that American society, by and large, still
expects women to remain at home caring for children and
household. In fact, sixty percent of American women do not hold
paying jobs for compensation outside the home. In Texas, those
wives are denied any voice in the management of the community
property in which they theoretically have a "present, vested
interest." As to them, then, the 1967 statute was a totally illusory
advance; they are left with no role in the management of their
share of the community property.
Beyond the fact that such wives are accorded only a highly
theoretical legal reward for their labors in rearing children and
caring for homes, the Texas system, like a separate property
system, may be unconstitutional under an Equal Rights Amendin impact
ment as a statute neutral on its face, but discriminatory
143
jobs.
paying
hold
against wives who do not
Because a separate management system does not recognize the
role of women in present society, it should not be the alternative
management system adopted after passage of an Equal Rights
Amendment.
CONCLUSION

Regardless of the fate of an Equal Rights Amendment,
140. It will be recalled that income from separate property which accrues after marriage is
community, not separate, property in Texas, Louisiana, and Idaho. See note 34, supra.
141. Tex. Family Code § 5.22 (Pamphlet 1972).
142. See discussion of defects in the separate property system supra at notes 24-29.
143. See cases and authority cited in note 29 supra; see also Community Property: Male
Management and Women's Rights, supra note 123, at 172, to the same effect.
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revision of the New Mexico community property statutes is
needed now. The statutes discussed in this article reflect the
attitudes of an era when married women were expected to rear
children, care for home and husband, and do nothing else.
Married women today still do these things, but they do much
besides. Forty percent of them hold paying jobs outside the
home; all of them take an active, informed role in the management of family finances.
The patently unrealistic provisions which deny married women
any voice in the management of personal community property
are today almost totally ignored; their greatest effect may be on
merchants faced with trying to collect an overdue bill incurred by
a married woman. The presumptions establishing property
evidenced by a document of title and held in the name of a
married woman alone as her separate property, not community
property, have a far more damaging effect, principally upon the
property rights of husbands who have no notion that such a law
exists.
The Bar and Legislature of the State of New Mexico have an
urgent responsibility to act to remove the glaring inequities, to
wives and husbands, which our community property statutes
impose. That responsibility will not cease if an Equal Rights
Amendment fails: let us not fail to meet it.

